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Note
Putting Teeth Into Minnesota's Employment
Discrimination Law: A Legislative Proposal
Defining Gender Stereotyping
Kari Aamot-Snapp
Stereotypes, like laws, usually persist even after the realities have
changed.'
As employers become more sophisticated in masking their discrimina-
tory motives, so too must the [law] become more sophisticated in craft-
ing tests to detect it.
2
The work world has changed considerably since employers
felt free to tell women 3 they would not be hired for "men's jobs."4
1. CAROL TAvars & CAROLE OFFEm, THE LONGEST WAR: SEx DIFFERENCES
I PERSPECTIVE 20 (1977).
2. J. Cindy Eson, Casenote, In Praise of Macho Women: Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 835, 854 (1992).
3. This Note focuses exclusively on discriminatory employer decision
making based on gender stereotyping. Because employer stereotyping based on
gender overwhelmingly penalizes women, this Note will refer to the plaintiff as
"she" throughout. See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of
Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 494 (1990) (citing various
studies of common gender stereotypes). According to research, "women who ex-
hibit[ ] a high degree of 'feminine' traits ... tend[ I to be far less successful in
their careers than those women who exhibit[ I a balance of 'nasculine' and fem-
inine' traits, or in whom the 'masculine' traits predominate( I." Id. at 496-97.
See generally MARGARET L. ANDERSEN, THINKING ABouT WOMEN: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERsPECTIVES ON SEx AND GENDER 101-39 (1994) (discussing social myths about
women's work that influence women's role in economic life); HARRIET BRADLEY,
MENes WORK, WOMEN's WoRc A SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE SEXuAL DM-
SION OF LABOUR IN EMPLOYMENT (1989) (discussing gender segregation and sex-
typing of jobs); FRANcnE D. BLAu & MAIA A. FERBER, THm ECONOMICS OF
WOMEN, MEN AN WORK (1986) (discussing traditional economic theory and
traditional women's occupations and their impact on the status of women); in-
fra note 83 (listing various gender stereotypes particularly relevant to work
performance).
4. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, a case decided twelve years ago, provides an
example of blatant sexism. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982) (class action suit
alleging employment discrimination on basis of sex in county sheriff's depart-
ment). Defendant, Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, when asked whether he
was prejudiced against women, replied, "I will say I don't want a woman work-
ing and I give them the reason .... It is not discrimination but I got good
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Unfortunately, the extinction of baldly expressed sexism has not
meant the extinction of gender bias in the work place.5 Certain
forms of bias, most commonly gender stereotyping,6 occur even
in the absence of explicit reference to gender. Many employers
still make gender-based decisions, particularly concerning high
level promotions, but they cite "neutral" reasons for their deci-
sions.7 The job no longer requires a man, per se, but it "re-
quires" aggressiveness, detachment, firm leadership, single-
minded commitment, even ruthlessness-traits that employers
consistently find lacking in female candidates. 8 At the same
time, employers find aggressive, detached or ruthless female
employees distastefully unfeminine, abrasive or overbearing.9
Thus employers trap female professionals in a "double bind,"
judging them incompetent if they act like women and labeling
them "difficult," or worse, if they act like men.1 0
reason for the way I am thinking... I know I wouldn't want my daughter or
my wife to hold that kind of job." Id. at 1371 n.20.
5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 161 (1989) ("Women have more opportunities for economic indepen-
dence than ever before in history, but certain obstacles persist .... Most female
employees.., have remained in relatively low-status, low-paying, female-domi-
nated vocations."); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price
Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1990) ("There remain employers who have been impervious
to legal pressures generated over twenty-five years to improve opportunities for
minorities and women.").
6. For an excellent discussion and definition of "the stereotyping process"
in the work place, see Radford, supra note 3, at 489-503; see also infra part HA-
B (describing gender stereotyping in employment).
7. Marina 0. Szteinbok, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title
VII Disparate Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1114
(1988) ("An employer who discriminates will seldom display prejudice bla-
tantly."); Susan Struth, Note, Permissible Sexual Stereotyping Versus Imper-
missible Sexual Stereotyping: A Theory of Causation, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
679, 695 (1989) ("[A discriminatory] employer's records often will not contain
arguably gender-biased comments made by the decision makers. . ").
8. See Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's
Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE
L.J. 1397, 1401-02 (1988) ("Large numbers of traditionally male jobs in our soci-
ety are mischaracterized as requiring traits predominantly associated with
men.").
9. See generally Radford, supra note 3 (discussing employers' attribution
of these traits to female employees). The female worker "will not succeed... if
she is too 'masculine' ... because she will be perceived as engaging in deviant
behavior unbecoming to her gender." Id. at 503.
10. See id. at 500-03 (explaining that women with "female" or "male" at-
tributes are discriminated against). Unable to win the employer acceptance
crucial to advancement, large numbers of female employees collect in the lower
levels of virtually every employment field. See Eichner, supra note 8, at 1404
(discussing the "double bind"); see also infra part H.B (explaining the "double
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Minnesota has been a pacesetter in the protection of em-
ployee civil rights," but that position is slipping. Federal and
various state courts have expressly addressed and prohibited
gender stereotyping in employer decision making.12 Minnesota,
by contrast, continues to use an employment discrimination
framework that has not materially changed in two decades.'3
The framework contains no language about gender stereotyping
and cannot facilitate an effective examination of complex, con-
troversial stereotyping claims. 14
This Note asserts that a legislative amendment to the Mdin-
nesota Human Rights Act defining illegal gender stereotyping
would help Minnesota courts recognize and penalize such stere-
otyping in claims brought under Minnesota's current discrimi-
nation framework. Part I describes Minnesota's framework,
making relevant comparisons to federal employment discrimina-
tion law. Part II describes the growing prevalence of gender
stereotyping in the work place, explains the gender stereotyping
process, and analyzes the insensitivity of current Minnesota law
and federal law to such stereotyping. Part III suggests that a
legislative definition of illegal stereotyping would assist litigants
bind"). See generally JoHN E. WLi~As & DEBORAH L. BEST, MEASURING SEX
STEREOTYPES: A MULTINATION STUDY 294 (1990) ("It appears that, in the
United States, the sex stereotypes create a barrier whenever persons of one sex
seek entry into an occupation that has traditionally been occupied primarily by
members of the other se."); Struth, supra note 7, at 679 (i[W]omen are still
experiencing barriers to equal employment opportunity. These barriers, in
part, are a result of persons continuing to associate particular personality char-
acteristics with each of the sexes, thereby perpetuating discrimination in the
workplace.").
11. "Minnesota has a long history of civil rights legislation and protection
for groups beyond that afforded by federal law." Carlson v. Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 623, 392 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Minn. 1986) (en banc).
12. See infra part I.B (describing federal law addressing stereotyping); note
62 (listing stereotype decisions in federal and other state courts).
13. Minnesota uses an employment discrimination framework created in
1973. See infra part I.B (describing the framework).
14. See infra part H.C (analyzing the limitations of the Minnesota frame-
work in stereotype cases). The framework's inadequacy discourages victims of
stereotype-based gender discrimination from bringing claims, shielding dis-
criminatory employers from liability. MINNESOTA SuPREFm, COURT TASK FORCE
FOR GENDER FArRNESS IN THE CoURTs FINAL REPORT 81 (1989) [hereinafter GEN-
DER FAINEss REPORT] (reporting that most Minnesota women who bring em-
ployment discrimination claims do not take their cases to state court).
Additionally, research reveals that only three Minnesota employment discrimi-
nation cases mention the word "stereotyping", even in passing. See Hengesteg
v. Ecolab, Inc., No. C1-91-2156, 1992 WL 89647, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5,
1992); Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Ridler
v. Olivia Pub. Sch. Sys. No. 653, 432 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see
also infra note 58 (discussing these cases).
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and judges to more effectively analyze stereotype claims. This
Note urges Minnesota to reestablish leadership in employment
discrimination jurisprudence by breaking its silence on this is-
sue and moving beyond the federal treatment of gender stere-
otyping to a more vigilant prohibition of this pervasive form of
bias.
I. DISPARATE TREATMENT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPLEX AND
EVOLVING
A. THE MINNESOTA HumAN RIGHTS ACT: A "BROAD REMEDIAL
PURPOSE"1 5
Legislation provides the platform for all employment dis-
crimination case law. At the federal level, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment.16 The
Minnesota Human Rights Act, enacted in 1955, made employ-
ment discrimination illegal on the state level.' 7 Section 363.03
of the Minnesota Act makes it an unfair and illegal employment
practice for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge, or other-
wise discriminate against an employee because of sex.18
In entrusting Minnesota courts with interpretation of the
Act, the legislature cautioned against "narrowly construing" any
of the statute's provisions. 19 It emphasized the Act's "broad re-
medial purpose"20 of "secur[ing] for persons in this state[ ] free-
dom from discrimination."21 As plaintiffs brought cases under
the Minnesota Act, Minnesota courts searched for a litigation
framework to organize judicial analysis and effectively imple-
ment the Act's goals. Noting the remarkable similarity between
15. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(Minn. 1988) (en banc).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
17. MIN. STAT. § 363.03 (Supp. 1993).
18. Id., subd. 1(2). The statute also prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, national origin, . .. marital status,
status with regard to public assistance, membership or activity in a local com-
mission, disability, sexual orientation, or age." Id.
19. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981)
(en banc) (discussing legislative intent underlying the Minnesota Act). See
MuNm. STAT. § 363.11 ("The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liber-
ally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.").
20. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(Minn. 1988) (en banc) (discussing legislative intent).
21. MINN. STAT. § 363.12.
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the Minnesota statute and Title VII,22 the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the federal framework for Minnesota employment
discrimination litigation.23
B. MINNESOTA'S FRAMEwORK: THE THREE-STEP "PRETEXT"
ANALYSis
In the complex arena of employment discrimination law,
courts examine allegedly discriminatory employment practices
under different schemes depending on the particular facts of
each case.24 If an employer practice or procedure impacts a cer-
tain protected class25 disparately, the case receives a "disparate
impact" analysis.26 If an employer treats individual members of
a protected group disparately, as they do when they apply gen-
der stereotypes to employees, the case requires "disparate treat-
22. Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (en banc). Title
VII declares that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-l)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
23. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 398-99 ("This court has applied principles devel-
oped in court decisions under Title VII for purposes of construing [the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act].").
24. The development of federal law, which parallels the development of
most state law, has been continuous since Title VII was passed in 1964. See
generally MARK A. Roms=aN ET AL., CAsEs AND MATERiALS ON EmpLyEnTr
LAw 234-59 (1991) (tracing the evolution of employment discrimination law).
In early years, courts assumed plaintiffs would have direct evidence of their
employer's discrimination. As it became clear that such direct evidence was
rare and becoming rarer, the United States Supreme Court created different
frameworks for plaintiffs relying on circumstantial evidence. See id.; see also
Radford, supra note 3, at 508 ("The manner in which disparate treatment cases
are adjudicated has evolved as the courts, litigants and attorneys have become
more sophisticated in dealing with employment decisions.").
25. For discussions of"protected class," see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
10 (1967) (containing one of the Supreme Court's earliest articulations of "pro-
tected class"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (referring to
the traditionally protected classes: "classifications based upon sex, like classifi-
cations based upon race, alienage, and natural origin are inherently suspect").
See also supra note 18 (listing the protected classes under Minnesota law, in
addition to gender).
26. See generally RoTHTsEIN, supra note 24, at 234-59 (citing cases). Dis-
parate impact discrimination occurs when an employer subjects its employees
to a facially neutral selection process that in practice has an adverse effect on
the employment opportunities of a "protected class." Id. at 248. Disparate im-
pact plaintiffs must introduce statistical evidence of discrimination, and case
law focuses on this requisite showing. Id.
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ment" analysis.2 7 In disparate treatment claims, courts must
establish whether the employer acted with discriminatory in-
tent,28 a requirement that adds complexity and subjectivity to
disparate treatment litigation.
Minnesota courts consider disparate treatment claims
under a three-step framework2 9 created in the 1973 United
States Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.30
At the framework's first stage, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination 3 ' by showing that she belongs
to a "protected class," 3 2 that she was qualified for, applied for,
and was rejected from a position or promotion,3 3 and that her
27. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact").
Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when an individual employee suffers
the impact of an adverse employment decision made by an employer motivated
by "illegitimate factors," as defined by Title VII. RoTHSrn, supra note 24, at
234.
28. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (explaining that unlike disparate
impact claims, [p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical" for disparate treat-
ment claims).
29. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623-
24 (Minn. 1988) (en banc) (describing the framework). The framework has
three stages-each a "shift in the burden of proof-designed to arrange com-
plex issues within disparate treatment claims for efficient judicial examination.
Id. Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981) (stating the federal Supreme Court's description of the framework's
stages). "The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens
serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ulti-
mate question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 253.
30. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Minnesota adopted the McDonnell Douglas
framework in 1978 and has used it exclusively for 16 years. See Danz v. Jones,
263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (en banc) (discussing suitability of Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework); see also McGrath v. TOF Bank Say., 509 N.W.2d
365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en bane) (clarifying the McDonnell Douglas method of
proof); Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623 (describing the framework); Hubbard v.
United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (en bane) (applying
McDonnell Douglas to a retaliatory discharge claim).
31. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. See MiNN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (listing as "protected classes"
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability,
and age).
33. Although disparate treatment employment discrimination cases most
often involve an employment decision to terminate or refuse to promote an em-
ployee, the range of employment decisions subject to review under the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act or Title VII is very broad. As the Court explained in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, for example, "the language of Title VII is not
limited to economic or tangible discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the en-
tire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment." 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
216
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employer continued to consider similarly qualified candidates af-
ter her rejection. 34
Successful establishment of a prima facie case raises a pre-
sumption of discrimination that the employer, in the second
phase of the McDonnell Douglas framework, must rebut to avoid
liability.3 5 The employer may overcome the presumption of dis-
cimination by articulating a "legitimate reason" for its adverse
decision concerning the employee.36
If the employer meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff pro-
ceeds in one of two ways: either by convincing the fact finder
that the employer's proffered reason was a mere "pretext"37 for
discrimination, or by offering direct evidence of discrimination.38
Thus, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, plaintiffs may
demonstrate discrimination by proving that "the reason ad-
vanced by [the employer] was 'pretextural' [sic] or that the 'dis-
criminatory reason' more likely than not motivated" the
employer's decision. 39 Either showing entitles her to a finding of
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (citation omitted), cert. granted and vacated, 461 U.S.
951 (1983)).
34. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
(outlining the requirements of a plaintiff's prima facie case under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework).
35. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
36. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If
the employer meets this burden, the case advances to the third and most sub-
stantive step of the McDonnell Douglas test. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
37. The Supreme Coures original articulation of the McDonnell Douglas
test contains an explanation of this term:
Title VII does not... permit [an employer] to use [an employee's] con-
duct as a pretext for [prohibited] discrimination .... [The plaintiff]
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a cover up for a... discriminatory decision.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
38. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
39. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627. Because directly persuading the
court that discrimination occurred is so often difficult, the McDonnell Douglas
test ostensibly gives the plaintiff an important advantage by allowing her to
disprove her employer's proffered reason. See Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) ("[Pllacing this burden of produc-
tion on the defendant thus serves... to frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.").
The federal courts' articulation of this burden was, until recently, very sim-
ilar: the plaintiff could prevail "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A 1993 Supreme Court decision, however, altered the
1994]
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liability.40
C. MINNESOTA'S REJECTION OF A "MIXED MOTIVE" ANALYSIS
Minnesota still uses McDonnell Douglas exclusively in dis-
parate treatment cases.41 Federal courts, by contrast, use two
frameworks. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins42 that McDonnell Douglas could
not appropriately serve all federal cases of disparate treatment
employment discrimination. 43 The "pretext" framework, ex-
plained the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion, assumes that a
discriminatory employer always has a single illegitimate motive,
which it attempts to cover up by concocting a single facially le-
gitimate motive. 4 Employers, however, often act upon "a mix-
ture of legitimate and illegitimate motives."45 Thus, the Price
federal interpretation somewhat. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993) (en banc). In language that seems to directly contradict McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, Justice Scalia wrote for a five-justice majority that an
employment discrimination plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict in a
disparate treatment case merely by demonstrating that her employer's prof-
fered reason was unbelievable. Id. at 2751-52. Instead, she must go on to
demonstrate that the employer's reason was discriminatory. Id. In short,
Hicks rejected the Burdine interpretation that McDonnell Douglas requires
either a direct showing of discrimination or a showing of pretext. Id. at 2752.
Instead, Hicks held that McDonnell Douglas requires both, at least in some
cases. Id.
Although Hicks stops short of dismantling McDonnell Douglas, it does, to
an extent that is presently unclear, weaken the previously powerful conse-
quences of a pretext showing in a disparate treatment case. See David S. Tatel
et al., Commentary, The 1992-93 Term of the United States Supreme Court and
its Impact on Public Schools, 85 EDUC. L. REP. 397 (1993) (explaining impact of
Hicks on plaintiff's burden of proof). Whether the Minnesota Supreme Court
ought to follow Hicks's lead or distance itself from the federal decision is a ques-
tion beyond the scope of this Note. If the Minnesota Supreme Court has made
any indication of its inclination, the indication is that Minnesota will not follow
Hicks. See McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en
banc) (holding that although a showing of pretext was one way of ensuring a
plaintiff's victory in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff may also prevail
"if an illegitimate reason 'more likely than no motivated the... decision")
(citing Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627).
40. But see supra note 39 (discussing Hicks).
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the McDonnell
Douglas three-step framework); see also infra note 55 (discussing application of
McDonnell Douglas to disparate treatment claims).
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id. The Price Waterhouse Court noted that, "the premise of [the Mc-
Donnell Douglas/Burdine "pretext" analysis] is that either a legitimate or an
illegitimate set of considerations led to the challenged decision." Id.
45. Id. In such cases, according to the Court, the "pretext" analysis be-
comes inappropriate because "it simply makes no sense to ask whether [a] legit-
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Waterhouse Court supplemented the "pretext" test with a second
disparate treatment framework specially designed for "mixed
motive" employment decisions.46
Although Price Waterhouse focuses on the debate between
"mixed" and "single motive" decisions, the case is equally impor-
tant because it is the first 47 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion to extensively discuss employment discrimination in the
form of gender stereotyping.48 Price Waterhouse plaintiff Ann
Hopkins offered evidence that decision makers at the Price
Waterhouse accounting firm denied her partnership because
they found her too "macho"49 and thought she should "'walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.'- 50 In
upholding Hopkins' discrimination charge, the Supreme Court
stated, "In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggres-
sive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."51
Many commentators, in part because of its ground breaking
imate reason" is the true reason. Id. Deciding Price Waterhouse as a "pretext"
case would "insist that [the McDonnell Douglas] framework perform work that
it was never intended to perform." Id. at 247.
46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47. Subsequent legislative action
altered Price Waterhouse's holding somewhat. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
shifted the employer's burden of showing it would have made the same employ-
ment decision, regardless of an employee's gender, from the liability to the dam-
ages phase of a lawsuit. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
47. Research reveals that no Supreme Court cases before Price Waterhouse
comprehensively address gender stereotyping by employers. See Tracy L. Bach,
Note, Gender Stereotyping in Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance
of Evidence and Causation Under Title VII, 77 MnN. L. REv. 1251, 1264 (1993)
(noting the significance of Price Waterhouse because "[f]or the first time, the
Supreme Court explicitly discussed gender stereotyping"). But see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) ("It is impermissible under Title VII to
refuse to hire... on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.");
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(making passing but undeveloped declarations against discrimination in the
form of stereotyping).
48. "As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 251.
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.D.C. 1985)). Hopkins introduced further evidence of employer statements
that she was "a lady using foul language" and that she "overcompensated for
being a woman." Id.
51. Id. at 250.
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discussion of stereotyping, praised Price Waterhouse as a signifi-
cant step for employment discrimination plaintiffs. 52 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court, however, opined that the Price
Waterhouse "mixed motive" framework might actually disadvan-
tage employment discrimination plaintiffs.53 Minnesota there-
fore declined to adopt the federal framework 54 and continues to
litigate all disparate treatment claims under McDonnell
Douglas.55
52. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 47, at 1264 ("The Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse changed the landscape of employment discrimination cases involv-
ing gender stereotyping... [by] finding that stereotyping provides evidence of
discrimination."). See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Patterson and Civil
Rights: What Rough Beast Slouches Towards Bethlehem to be Born?, 21 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 401, 452 (1990) ("Hopkins is the one decision of the October
1988 term enforcing a broad interpretation of a civil rights law."); William B.
Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989:
Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1499 (1990)
("Price Waterhouse [was] a decision widely heralded as a major victory for plain-
tiffs in employment discrimination cases .... ."); Cassandra Butts et al., Com-
ment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988
Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 475, 531 (1990) ("The Price Waterhouse decision represented a significant,
though mixed, victory for civil rights plaintiffs."); Cheryl A. Pilate, Comment,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Mixed Outcome for Title VII Mixed-Motive
Plaintiffs, 38 KAN. L. Rlv. 107, 108 (1989) ("Amid the rapid razing of estab-
lished civil rights law, one case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, emerged as a lone
victory [for employment discrimination plaintiffs].").
53. Shortly before Price Waterhouse was decided, the Minnesota Supreme
Court heard a similar case and rejected the "mixed motive" analysis. See An-
derson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627 (Minn. 1988) (en
banc). The Anderson court stated that the "same decision" element of the mixed
motive framework, which allowed defendants "definitionally guilty" of discrimi-
nation to escape liability, "would defeat the broad remedial purposes of the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act." Id. at 626.
54. Although the problems with the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive"
framework that the Minnesota Supreme Court diagnosed were arguably cor-
rected at the federal level by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see supra note 46, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not reconsidered adopting a mixed motive
framework.
55. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 626-27 ("Courts of this state should con-
tinue to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment cases involving
claims of disparate treatment brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
regardless of whether a claim has the label of being a 'single-motive' or 'mixed-
motive' case."). See also McGrath v. TCF Bank Say., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366
(Minn. 1993) (en banc) (applying McDonnell Douglas); Sigurdson v. Isanti
County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. 1986) (en banc) (same); Hubbard v. United
Press Intl, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (en banc) (same).
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II. MINNESOTA AND FEDERAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT LAW: INEFFECTIVE IN
STEREOTYPE CASES
Minnesota's rejection of Price Waterhouse's framework is
not in itself problematic. 56 What is disturbing is Minnesota's
failure to articulate a prohibition of sex stereotyping, like that in
Price Waterhouse, within its preferred McDonnell Douglas juris-
prudence, or to address stereotyping anywhere in its case law.
Minnesota courts have cited McDonnell Douglas in more
than 100 cases.57 None contains a sustained discussion of gen-
der stereotyping in the work place.58 This suggests either that
Minnesota plaintiffs are not bringing stereotype cases,5 9 or that
Minnesota judges are not recognizing and discussing the stereo-
type issues that do come before them.60
The lack of judicial discussion of stereotyping is especially
troubling given Minnesota's established leadership in civil
rights law.6 1 Currently, Minnesota lags behind federal courts in
56. For a discussion of Price Waterhouse's limitations as a stereotyping
case, see infra part II.D. But see McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 502 N.W.2d 801,
807 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (alluding to possible benefits to Minnesota case
law of a Price Waterhouse "mixed-motive" analysis).
57. Research shows that the federal McDonnell Douglas decision is cited in
123 Minnesota cases. Search of Westlaw, MN-CS database (July 9, 1994).
58. Of the 123 Minnesota cases citing McDonnell Douglas, only three men-
tion the word stereotyping, one time each. Search of Westlaw, MN-CS database
(July 9, 1994); see Hengesteg v. Ecolab, Inc., No. C1-91-2156, 1992 WL 89647,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 1992) (plaintiff who offered evidence that her em-
ployer stereotyped her as "dependent" lost a disparate treatment challenge
under McDonnell Douglas); Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (mentioning "stereotypes" of AIDS victims in discrimination case
against a dentist); Ridler v. Olivia Pub. Sch. Sys. No. 653, 432 N.W.2d 777, 783
(Minn. 1988) (citing a federal court's statement mentioning stereotyping to sup-
port its holding that men as well as women could sue under Title VII and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act). None of these opinions contains sustained dis-
cussion of gender stereotyping in employment decisions, or a definition of illegal
gender stereotyping.
59. Indeed, a study of the subject revealed that Minnesota plaintiffs do
avoid state court, and may avoid litigation altogether, when they experience
gender-based discrimination. See GENDER FAnRNEss REPORT, supra note 14, at
81 ("Most employment discrimination cases [in Minnesota] are handled in fed-
eral court .... This low number of cases in state courts... could indicate either
the reluctance of victims to seek legal redress or a preference for other fo-
rums."). Furthermore, the study reports, "fewer than one-quarter of the state's
judges have handled gender-based employment discrimination cases in state
court within the last two years (1986-1988)." Id.
60. See infra part II.E.1 (analyzing judicial insensitivity to stereotyping
issues).
61. "The scope of discrimination liability, and its consequences, is more on-
erous under our state laws than under Title VII." Carlson v. Independent Sch.
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redressing gender stereotyping, and behind the many states
that have incorporated Price Waterhouse's explicit prohibition
against stereotyping into their employment discrimination case
law.62 To regain its position as a pioneer in this area, Minnesota
must go beyond the ultimately unsatisfying Price Waterhouse
language to a more effective proscription of employment discrim-
ination based on gender stereotyping.
Dist. No. 623, 392 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Minn. 1986) (en banc). See also United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Minn. 1981) (en banc) (not-
ing, in reference to the legislative history of employment discrimination prohi-
bition in the Minnesota Human Rights Act, that the Minnesota legislature
extended "full and equal privileges" to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
state of Minnesota" fully "ten years before the United States Supreme Court
[reversed] the 'separate but equal' fiction justifying the Jim Crow laws").
62. Federal courts have addressed the illegality of stereotyping while Min-
nesota courts have not. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
240, 251 (1988) ("We take [Title VII] to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.... [W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group .... ."); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) ("A statute based on such stereotypical assumptions
would, of course, be inconsistent with Title VIrs goal of equal employment op-
portunity."); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978) ("'In forbidding employers to discriminate against individ-
uals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'") (cit-
ing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977)
("But whatever the verbal formulation, the federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on
the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes."). Federal courts' more
explicit treatment of stereotyping may explain why most Minnesota disparate
treatment cases are tried in federal, not state, court. GENDER FAnEss RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 81.
Other states, unlike Minnesota, have adopted Price Waterhouse and its pro-
hibition of stereotyping into their disparate treatment jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Levey v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. 1-90-1121, 1993 WL
53790, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse for sup-
port in declaring gender stereotyping "wholly illegitimate"); Montana Rail Link
v. Byard, 860 P.2d 121, 127 (Mont. 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse as authority
for allowing expert testimony on gender stereotyping); Robb v. Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ., 635 A.2d 586, 593 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (applying Price
Waterhouse "theory" of stereotyping); Graff v. Eaton, 598 A.2d 1383, 1384-86
(Vt. 1991) (citing Price Waterhouse for support in holding that evidence of heavy
reliance on stereotypes enables the discrimination plaintiff to meet her burden
of proof); Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 795 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (N.M. 1990)
(holding that lower court correctly gave a "Price Waterhouse stereotype instruc-
tion" to the jury).
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A. THE CHANGING COMPLEXION OF EMPLOYER
DISCRIMINATION: STEREOTYPING GROWS PREVALENT AS
BLATANT DISCREMNATION BEcOMs TABOO
Regardless of the framework used, employment discrimina-
tion law will be ineffective today unless judges and lawyers rec-
ognize and penalize gender stereotyping when it surfaces in
discrimination claims. For a combination of reasons, stereotype-
infused decision-making is becoming the most common form of
employment discrimination against women. As a result, it is the
central issue in most gender-based disparate treatment claims.
At the time McDonnell Douglas was decided, women were
fighting employment discrimination to simply attain jobs.63 Dis-
crimination plaintiffs were not challenging the belief that they
could not perform certain jobs well; rather, they were fighting
for the right to work in certain jobs at all.64 Employers were
resisting the presence of a woman anywhere in the office, not
just the presence of women as partners and company
presidents.65
Today, by contrast, the numbers of women and men in the
work force are nearly equal.66 Employment discrimination,
however, has not disappeared. It has merely crept up the career
ladder.6 7 Below the infamous "glass ceiling,"68 women now have
relatively equal employment opportunities, but the upper eche-
63. Radford, supra note 3, at 481-82, 515 n.198 ("At the time Title VII was
passed, a job advertisement which noted that 'women need not apply' was not
uncommon.").
64. Id.; see also Anta Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping,
43 ARK. L. R-v. 27, 55 (1990) ("[Elnforcement of Title VII is moving into a sec-
ond generation of lawsuit, one that challenges decision making by professionals
about professionals").
65. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that the job of "switch-man" must be held open to women as well
as men).
66. See JONI SEAGER & ANN OLSON, WOMEN IN THE WoRLD: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL ATLAS 16 (1986) (reporting women constitute nearly half the paid labor
force in America). See also VmGn-IA SAPIRO, WOMEN IN AmERiCAN SocmrY 378
(1989) (reporting that by 1986, women comprised forty percent of the work
force).
67. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1026 ("We are less racist and sexist
than we were twenty-five years ago... [yet] there remain employers who have
been impervious to legal pressures . . . to improve opportunities for . . .
women.").
68. "Glass ceiling" is a popular term for what social scientists call "hierar-
chical" or "vertical segregation," which means the confinement of women to
lower paying, lower prestige positions within given fields. See generally BLAu &
FERBER, supra note 3, at 161-63 (discussing hierarchical segregation within
university facilities); Elanor Lyon, The Economics of Gender, in SEx RoLES AND
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Ions of most fields are still overwhelmingly populated by men,69
and several particularly prestigious or well paying professions
remain largely or entirely closed to women.70
Consequently, today's discrimination plaintiffs bring fewer
SoCIAL PATTERNS 174-77 (Francis A. Bodreau et al., eds. 1986) (discussing bar-
riers to upward occupational mobility).
69. See Radford, supra note 3, at 490-93 (explaining the concentrations of
women in lower paying, less powerful or less prestigious work); RHODE, supra
note 5, at 161 ("Women have more opportunities for economic independence
than ever before in history, but certain obstacles persist .... Most female em-
ployees ... have remained in relatively low-status, low-paying, female-domi-
nated vocations."); see also BLAu & FERBER, supra note 3, at 153 ("[W]omen who
have succeeded in reaching the highest levels in business, unions, government,
or academia are still extremely rare."); ANDERSEN, supra note 3, at 119
("[W]ithin the professions, women are concentrated in the lower ranks and in
less prestigious specialties."); Lyon, supra note 68, at 169 ("The female sector of
the labor market.., is predominantly associated with lower and middle status
work in less prestigious firms."). See generally SusAN FALuI, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERicAN WOMEN 363-99 (1991) (citing numerous
statistics of the current, discouraging situation of women within the American
work force).
Indeed, there is every indication that discriminatory forces are still operat-
ing in Minnesota work places. See, e.g., Bob von Sternberg, Women, Minorities
Mostly at Bottom of Metro Job Market, STAR Tam. (Mpls.), Dec. 6, 1992, at 1A
(reporting the results of a Minnesota census as showing that, "[wiomen and
minorities in the Twin Cities have made considerably less headway in cracking
several employment bastions traditionally held by white men than they have in
the nation as a whole"); Richard Chin, Women Secured Job Gains in '80s, Large
Number Move Up to Management Ranks, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 15,
1992, at 1A (reporting a study of Minnesota women in the work force as show-
ing that "[miany traditionally female jobs-secretaries, telephone operators, el-
ementary school teachers-still are dominated by women. And women have
made only small inroads into some traditionally male jobs .... What is more,
even where the gains were made, they often were in the lower-paying end ofjob
categories."); Donna Halvorsen, Women Lawyers Paid Less, Face Job Discrimi-
nation, Study Says, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Oct. 27, 1989, at B7 ("[Al study commis-
sioned by Minnesota Women Lawyers raises important questions about
whether the recent influx of women law graduates is being assimilated into the
profession.").
70. Social scientists call this phenomena "occupational segregation," distin-
guishing it from the "hierarchical segregation" that operates to confine women
to lower jobs within an occupation. In America, certain occupations are clearly
segregated by sex; for example, 96% of all electrical and electronic engineers are
male. See BRADLEY, supra note 3, at 17. Bradley cites other statistics: "In
traditional blue-collar areas women are particularly poorly represented, being
in 1982 less than 2 per cent of carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians, truck
drivers and automobile mechanics." Id. By contrast, "in the early 1980s [wo-
men] were 99 percent of typists, secretaries and telephone operators, 97 per
cent of household service workers, [and] 94 per cent of keypunchers." Id. See
also Lyon, supra note 68, at 161 ("Women and men are still largely concen-
trated in different industries and occupations-those most compatible with
traditional notions of sex-appropriate work."); BLAU & FERBER, supra note 3, at
160, 167 (charting the percentage of female workers in selected professional
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claims contesting hiring decisions, and more claims challenging
promotion and partnership decisions.71 Upper level employ-
ment decision-making processes are more complex than hiring
procedures because they almost always include an extensive
subjective evaluation of the employee's qualifications and per-
sonality.72 Such evaluations are inherently prone to the use of
gender stereotypes. 73 Predictably, then, as the percentage of
discrimination claims challenging upper level decisions in-
creases, judges encounter more stereotyping issues in the
courtroom.
Additionally, women's progress toward equal opportunity in
employment and increased legal regulation of employment deci-
sions have heightened employer awareness of discrimination
since the 1960s and '70s.74 The presence of women at work and
occupations); LnDA L. LI-DsEY, GENDER ROLEs: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
187-89 (1990) (discussing the "occupational distribution of women").
One particularly harmful consequence of occupational segregation is that
the jobs largely performed by men uniformly pay better than jobs largely per-
formed by women, even when both jobs require comparable skill and education.
See ANDERSEN, supra note 3, at 115, 117 ("[Women are most heavily concen-
trated in those jobs that have been the most devalued-both economically and
socially.... [O]ccupations most populated by women workers are the lowest
paid of all occupations."). In 1990, women employed full time and year round
earned only 71% of salaries earned by men employed full time and year round.
Id. at 101. Andersen goes on to note that "[w]omen college graduates, on the
average, earned the equivalent of men with only a high school education." Id.
See generally LINDsEY, supra, at 189-90 (discussing and charting the "wage
gap" between men and women).
71. See Cava, supra note 64, at 55 (describing the "second generation" of
employment discrimination law suits).
72. See Radford, supra note 3, at 484 ("[A]s women attempt to rise to posi-
tions of power, a new set of evaluation standards, based on intangible personal
assets, is applied. When looking for leaders... decision makers search for more
than just physical ability or technical competence. Personal attributes take on
prime importance."); Cava, supra note 64, at 55 (noting that upper level evalua-
tion focuses on personality and the "over-all picture of the person").
73. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv.
340, 345 (1989) ("[When] employment decisions [are]... subjective rather than
objective... ambiguous criteria for success often lead to the evaluation of a
candidate based on personal impressions. As a result, these procedures are
particularly vulnerable to the influence of gender bias through sex-role stere-
otyping."); Radford, supra note 3, at 474 ("The question... [is] whether females
suffer disproportionately from this evaluative device, which, although neutral
on its face, is affected profoundly by preconceived notions of the 'appropriate'
roles and traits of women and men."); Eson, supra note 2, at 848-49 ("Evalua-
tions that are subjective are more likely to be tainted by... male bias because
they reveal the evaluator's unreflective perceptions of the employee's perform-
ance-perceptions that cannot be reduced to a standardized measure.").
74. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 168 ("Before passage of antidiscrimination
legislation in the early 1960s, many employers were surprisingly public about
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costly gender discrimination suits are just two circumstances
employers did not face a few decades ago.7 5 Consequently, to-
day's employers couch discriminatory treatment of all kinds in
subtle terms.76 Rather than citing gender as a factor in an em-
ployment decision, an employer describes the employee's failure
to meet subjective job qualifications, or a particular personality
problem, as grounds for a negative evaluation. 77
Finally, as women move into higher, more powerful posi-
tions, resistance against that movement intensifies. 78 The entry
of women into the top echelons of various fields is more threat-
ening to male control79 than their entry into low paying and low
prestige jobs.80 A largely male law firm is likely to resist a fe-
male partner more strenuously than a female law clerk, just as a
male dominated company is more likely to resist a female presi-
dent than a female secretary."' Increased resistance means in-
their private biases.... [However,] changing attitudes and statutory mandates
have made such overt discrimination increasingly rare.").
75. Id. Rhode describes the work world before the mid-1960s: "[S]ome job
advertisements openly specified 'males preferred,' and many workplaces had
separate job titles, pay scales, and promotion channels for men and women per-
forming substantially the same work." Id.
76. William L. Kandel, Current Developments in Employment Litigation,
15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 101, 113 (1989) (commenting that employers are un-
likely twenty-five years after the enactment of Title VII to allow courts to re-
ceive smoking gun evidence of gender discrimination).
77. Of course, employers who discriminate blatantly still surface. See, e.g.,
Walsdorfv. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (examining a
witness's testimony that the defendant employer stated concerning the plain-
tiff's bid for a position, "ain't no bitch gonna get this job. My man's already
picked out and that's the way it's going to be," to which the court responded,
"[tihere may exist a more unequivocal way to express an intent to exclude wo-
men from consideration for a promotion, but none come readily to mind").
78. For an illuminating discussion of power, the advancement of women
into higher level positions, and increased male resistance, see Radford, supra
note 3, at 475-84.
79. Author Christine Littleton describes "male control" as "concentrated in
the hands of a few men who are at or near the top of intersecting hierarchies of
sex, race, and class .... " Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equal-
ity, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1317 (1987).
80. Radford comments that the entrance of women into the "club of the
powerful" at the upper levels of professional employment "is not accomplished
as easily as was the movement by women into the workplace." Radford, supra
note 3, at 483. "Unlike entry-level positions, which pose no threat to those al-
ready in power, the promotion of women to positions involving prestige and in-
fluence is a direct threat to male decision makers. In other words, women do
not just want jobs-they want their jobs." Id. at 484. See also Cava, supra note
64, at 55 (explaining that the enforcement of employment discrimination law is
becoming more difficult as employees begin to challenge "decision making by
professionals about professionals").
81. Radford, supra note 3, at 484.
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creased reliance on anything that weeds women out of
competition for such jobs, including gender stereotyping.8 2
Thus, this shift in the dynamics of the work world has made
stereotyping a common current form of discrimination against
female employees.
B. How GENDER STEREOTYPING OPERATES AGAINST
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN: THE "DoUBLE BIND"
Employers stereotype women in two fundamental ways.8 3
82. Id.
83. For a general discussion of stereotyping, see Radford, supra note 3, at
489 (describing the two-step stereotyping process of categorizing people into
groups and then attributing certain traits to the groups). A 1972 study of traits
attributed to the two sexes is revealing:
In what has been referred to as the "definitive work on sex-role stereo-
types," Broverman measured the degree to which various personality
traits were perceived as typical of men or of women. Adjectives that
consistently were viewed as describing "male" traits included the fol-
lowing aggressive, independent, unemotional, objective, not easily in-
fluenced, dominant, calm, active, competitive, logical, worldly, skilled
in business, direct, adventurous, self-confident, ambitious. Adjectives
representing "female" traits included: talkative, does not use harsh
language, tactful, gentle, aware of other's feelings, religious, neat,
quiet, easily expresses tender feelings, very strong need for security.
Id. at 494 (citing Inge K. Broverman et al., Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current
Appraisal, 28 J. Soc. IssuEs 59 (1972)). See also SusAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 53-55 (1984) ("That stereotypes of men are more
positive than those of women is unquestionably true. Stereotypically, men are
active, independent, competitive, and ambitious, while women are passive, de-
pendent, intuitive, and uncompetitive."). Dr. Fiske testified as an expert wit-
ness on stereotyping before the United States Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
These researchers put the different traits associated with men and women
in an employment context:
Judged on the basis of statements employers themselves make... be-
liefs regarding differences in average ability or behavior by sex are
quite common. For example, in one study male managers and admin-
istrators compared men and women with respect to a variety of traits
that are likely to be related to productivity. Men as a group were rated
more highly on understanding the "big picture," of the organization;
approaching problems rationally; getting people to work together; un-
derstanding financial matters; sizing up situations accurately; admin-
istrative capability; leadership potential; setting long-range goals and
working toward them; wanting to get ahead; standing up under fire;
keeping cool in emergencies; independence and self-sufficiency; and ag-
gressiveness. Women [were rated] more highly on clerical aptitude; be-
ing good at detail work; and enjoyment of routine tasks.
BLAu & FERBER, supra note 3, at 252. One researcher made an even more star-
tling discovery in a study of how the sex of a job applicant interacts with that
applicant's ability in affecting employer judgments of occupational suitability:
"[R]emarkabl[y,]... the sex-appropriateness variable was much more powerful
than the qualifications variable; poorly qualified people of one sex were judged
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In the first type of stereotyping, an employer evaluates or criti-
cizes an employee based on the employee's gender.84 For exam-
ple, an employer demotes an employee for unacceptable
"abrasiveness," 5 but closer examination reveals that the em-
ployee is not "abrasive" as an objective matter, but is abrasive
"for a woman."8 6 Differing standards of "acceptable" work con-
duct for men and women constitute disparate treatment if ad-
verse consequences attach to female employees' failure to meet
the stricter female standard.8 7 Put differently, when behavior is
tolerable or admirable when displayed by male employees, but
unacceptable when displayed by female employees, the employer
is discriminating through "disparate evaluation" stereotyping.88
In the second kind of stereotyping, employers impose dis-
criminatory employment criteria upon employees based on ster-
eotyped notions about the demands of the job.8 9 An employer
more suitable for same-sex occupations than highly qualified persons of the
other sex." WILLIAMs & BEST, supra note 10, at 294 (describing results of a
1980 study by American researcher Kalin).
84. See generally Radford, supra note 3, at 499-501 (describing the stere-
otyping of "masculine" women in the work place).
85. Abrasiveness and aggressiveness are personality traits that often sur-
face in "disparate evaluation" stereotyping. See id.; see also, e.g., Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989) (describing the employer ac-
counting firm's evaluation of the employee: "[Oin too many occasions, however,
Hopkins' aggressiveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness.... [The
evaluating partners indicated] that she was sometimes overly aggressive and
unduly harsh.").
86. See Radford, supra note 3, at 501 (noting that "even when men and
women engage in the same power strategies, women using these strategies are
viewed as... less likeable than the men").
87. Stereotyping of this type usually occurs when the employer cites, as its
proffered reason for demoting or not hiring a female employee, personality
traits traditionally considered "masculine." See Eson, supra note 2, at 845
("[Aggression, like other characteristics attributed to males, is negatively eval-
uated when displayed by women."); Heather K Gerken, Understanding Mixed
Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional
Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1993) ("[Wlomen who exhibit the masculine characteristics
traditionally associated with success suffer the effects of sex stereotyping be-
cause employers tend to perceive women negatively when they do not conform
to feminine stereotypes."); Radford, supra note 3, at 501 ("[Wlomen who use
power strategies typically associated with [men] may be deemed to be engaging
in a type of behavior which is 'unnatural.'").
88. See generally FIsxE & TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 53-55 ("When a man
and a woman perform exactly the same behavior, a man's performance may be
evaluated more favorably than a woman's.").
89. Many employers, for example, unreasonably believe that certain jobs
demand certain character traits more predominant in men. See Eichner, supra
note 8, at 1398-99 ("[Jlob descriptions... that have been adapted to male in-
cumbents continue to bar women from those sectors of the labor market from
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using this form of stereotyping harbors unrealistically narrow or
biased standards for effective job performance that exclude wo-
men from those jobs.90 For example, an employer refuses an em-
ployee's promotion bid, finding her "too emotional" for a high
level position, but the employer's assessment is not relevant to
the demands of the job.91 Rather, the "stoicism" requirement is
rooted in gender bias existing in the employer's thought process:
men have performed this job in the past, men are stoic, therefore
this job requires stoicism. 92
"Disparate criteria" discrimination is difficult for female em-
ployees to prove in court because the employer applies the same
job requirements to its male and female employees, creating the
illusion of equal treatment on the job.9 3 Because all the "neces-
sary"94 criteria are "masculine,"95 however, many more women
which they were once historically excluded by intentional discrimination.");
Radford, supra note 3, at 479 ("'[F]emale' or 'feminine' roles and traits are usu-
ally the antithesis of the traits thought related to success and effectiveness.");
Gerken, supra note 87, at 1824 ("Sex-stereotyped notions of achievement cause
employers to define success in masculine terms and to undervalue women's ac-
complishments."); see also id. ("Anything that heightens an employer's aware-
ness of a worker's femininity may adversely affect the employer's evaluation of
her performance because it highlights the differences between her identity and
the masculine qualities traditionally associated with success."). As one re-
searcher succinctly stated: "women do not fit the managerial stereotype."
Lyon, supra note 68, at 174.
90. See Eson, supra note 2, at 846 (listing typical "masculine" traits that
most employers uniformly demand of upper level professionals: "persistence
and drive, personal dedication, aggressiveness, emotional detachment, and a
kind of sexless matter-of-factness equated with intellectual performance").
91. One author notes how common this is:
Many jobs in today's labor market require traits ... generally associ-
ated with men. Although such job demands typically are perceived as
necessary for optimal job performance, often they are unconnected to
the actual needs of the job itself. Instead, these requirements are
based on the faulty supposition that the job must be performed as it
has always been performed ....
Eichner, supra note 8, at 1401. As one successful businesswoman's employer
allegedly phrased this stereotype-based demand for masculine behavior from
female employees: "'I'm not going to pay you like a broad, and I'm not going to
treat you like a broad, so don't act like a broad.'" Jane Gross, Against the Odds:
A Woman's Ascent on Wall Street, N.Y. TmEs MAG., Jan. 6, 1985, at 16. The
employer seems not to have entertained the possibility that a woman might be
paid and treated like male employees without acting like them.
92. See Eichner, supra note 8, at 1401.
93. For an excellent discussion of the difficulty women have making courts
acknowledge this kind of gender discrimination, see CAHRINE A. MACKiNNON,
TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF Tr= STATE 215-34 (1989).
94. Studies show that currently required "masculine" traits are, in fact, not
at all "necessary" for the performance of traditionally male jobs. See SAMUEL
CoN, THE PROCESS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEx-TYPING: THE FEMINIZATION OF CLER-
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than men are excluded under the employer's evaluation
process. 96
The two breeds of stereotyping do not occur independently.
Their operation is simultaneous, and traps professional women
in a double bind.97 Female employees who display a personality
matching gender stereotypes of women are perceived to be "too
feminine" for the job under "disparate criteria" stereotyping, and
those who display a personality matching male stereotypes are
considered "too masculine" for employer tastes under "disparate
evaluation" stereotyping.98 The Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse illustrates this trap, using the specific trait of ag-
gressiveness: "An employer who objects to aggressiveness in wo-
men but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they be-
have aggressively and out of a job if they do not."99
ICAL LABOR iN GREAT BmRTAIN 13-16 (1985); see also Eichner, supra note 8, at
1402 ("As sociologists have long recognized... sex-typed traits commonly asso-
ciated with a job often have little inherent connection with performance; in-
stead, the perception that a job requires masculine traits typically derives from
associating the job with its incumbents.").
95. This description of a successful female business school dean which ap-
peared in the New York Times in 1984, is revealing: "Mrs. Bailey, a short,
stocky, 45-year-old woman with a firm chin and a determined expression is
pushing the Pittsburgh-based school into the middle of the computer age." Kirk
Johnson, Technology's Dean: Elizabeth E. Bailey; A Computer Whiz at the Helm
of Carnegie-Mellon, N.Y. Tinds, Aug. 26, 1984, at C5. The reporter's extremely
masculine description of Elizabeth Bailey's personality and appearance seems
intended to legitimize her as a "real player" in the male-dominated business
world.
96. Maxine Eichner describes this phenomenon as a "vicious cycle for many
women" because "[when] employers fail to hire women who cannot or will not
adopt 'male' standards of behavior[, mien continue to dominate th[olse posi-
tions, which, in turn, continue to be viewed as male and adapted to men."
Eichner, supra note 8, at 1404.
97. See Radford, supra note 3, at 502 ("[Numerous studies have shown
that even though 'feminine' management styles are deemed weaker and inade-
quate, women who are perceived as using 'masculine' management styles are,
at best, deemed ineffective and, at worst, resented and viewed as overbearing.").
The Supreme Court sums up the interaction between the two forms of stere-
otyping as follows: "In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
98. Rhode describes the double bind: "[Women] who conform to traditional
definitions of femininity have often appeared lacking in the assertiveness neces-
sary for occupational success, while those who conform to masculine models
have appeared bitchy, aggressive, or difficult to work with." RHODE, supra note
5, at 167.
99. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. Against this powerful combination
of stereotype-infused forces, working women often have little or no chance to
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C. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MINNESOTA'S McDoAWNzL
DouGLAS FRAMwoRK IN STEREOTYPE CASES
Despite the societal changes in the work force described ear-
lier that have made stereotyping the predominant form of em-
ployment discrimination,1 0 0 Minnesota courts continue to use a
disparate treatment employment discrimination framework that
makes no reference to stereotyping'O' and was not created for
stereotype cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, the disparate
treatment plaintiff may choose between two strategies. She may
attempt to prove either that "the reason advanced by [her em-
ployer] was 'pretextual'" or that "[a] 'discriminatory reason'
more likely than not motivated [the employer's decision]." 0 2
Neither option, unaided, lends itself to a theoretically synthe-
sized discussion of stereotype issues. To be effective, the law's
prohibition of stereotyping cannot be "interpreted into" a twenty
year old framework; it must be explicit and specific.
1. The McDonnell Douglas Pretext Challenge: Semantically
Misleading in Stereotype Cases
The employee's first option under McDonnell Douglas,
showing that any legitimate motives proffered by her employer
are "pretextual,"10 3 cannot accommodate a meaningful inquiry
into stereotype issues. The pretext challenge becomes awkward
in stereotyping cases because it does not allow the plaintiff to
rise to the top levels of male dominated professions. "Stereotyping... creates
barriers to women's advancement in the work place, both by limiting a woman's
achievements and by tainting an employer's evaluation of those accomplish-
ments." Gerken, supra note 87, at 1827. The majority remain pooled in low or
perhaps middle level careers, excluded from higher paying, more prestigious
employment. See SEAGER & OLsON, supra note 66, at 18 (offering research that
in the United States a vast majority of women who work outside the home work
in the job "ghettos" of low level teaching, sales, nursing, child care, or bank
telling); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1163, 1189 (1988) ("[Sex stereotyping] entrench[es] gender hierarchies.");
Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 349 (1980) ("[Sex stereotyp-
ing constitutes] a primary obstacle to equal employment opportunity.").
100. See supra part IIA (discussing these changes).
101. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (containing
the Minnesota framework).
102. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627
(Minn. 1988) (en banc); see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (explain-
ing McDonnell Douglas's two options).




challenge the legitimacy, as opposed to the truth, of an employer
motive allegedly affected by gender bias.
The option of challenging employer statements as pretex-
tual invites the plaintiff to contest the truth of defendants' prof-
fered motives. 10 4 This challenge will succeed only if an
employer's motive is not true, that is, if it is an intentional
"cover up" for a discriminatory motive.' 0 5 In a stereotype case,
however, the plaintiff contests not the truth of the employer's
motive, but the legitimacy of the motive. The stereotype plain-
tiff concedes that the employer did not fabricate a motive, or
that the motive as articulated by the employer is its "real" mo-
tive, but argues that the motive is discriminatory because it is
based on stereotyping.
The distinction between contesting the truth of an em-
ployer's motive, as the plaintiff does in a pretext challenge, and
contesting the legitimacy of the motive is a subtle but important
one.' 0 6 On the surface, it seems as if stereotype cases could be
litigated under a pretext analysis. The plaintiff in a stereotype
case could use her evidence to show that her employer was "re-
ally" motivated by gender bias, using the language of the pretext
framework.' 07 The plaintiff's claim, however, would inevitably
suffer because the precise challenge in a stereotype case is not
that the employer was "really" motivated by something else, it is
104. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)
(stating that under the "pretext" challenge: "[plaintiff must] show[ ] that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence").
105. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 ("[O]n the retrial respondent must
be given a[nl... opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a...
discriminatory decision.").
106. See generally Eileen M. Fields, 1985-1986 Annual Survey of Labor Re-
lations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C. L. Rav. 170, 176-81
(1986) (discussing the shortcomings of the McDonnell Douglas "pretext" analy-
sis in stereotype cases). A plaintiff makes a "pretext" attack, or disputes the
truth of an employer's motive, when she argues that the employer was not re-
ally motivated by its proffered motivation. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
805. The "pretext" challenge implies that if the employer had been motivated
by its proffered reason, its decision would not have been discriminatory. Id.
Thus, in a pretext challenge, the reason challenged is itself legitimate; the ille-
gitimacy of the decision stems from the employer's use of the reason as a
coverup.
In a stereotype case, the employee does not dispute whether the employer
was "actually motivated" by its proffered reason. Rather, the employee agrees
that the motive articulated by the employer led to its decision. The employee
introduces evidence, however, that the motive itself is based on stereotyping
and therefore discriminatory.
107. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (plaintiff in a "pretext" case
shows that employer's explanation is unworthy of credence).
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that the employer's motive "really" is gender bias.'0 8 In the
words of the Supreme Court, "it simply makes no sense to ask,"
in stereotype cases, whether the reason actually relied on by the
employer was its "true reason."10 9 Requiring her to twist her
evidence into the malfitting "pretext" language distorts crucial
elements of the stereotype plaintiff's claim. Thus, the McDon-
nell Douglas "pretext" challenge is not an effective legal plat-
form for stereotype cases.
2. The Existing but Weak Option of Proving Discrimination
Directly in Stereotype Cases
Although she cannot present her evidence within a pretext
challenge, the gender stereotype plaintiff may introduce that ev-
idence as part of a direct showing that discrimination "more
likely than not motivated" her employer's decision.110 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court articulates this second option under Mc-
Donnell Douglas in terms so broad as to permit, presumably, the
introduction of stereotype evidence in disparate treatment
claims."'1
Yet, simply because the second alternative of McDonnell
Douglas does not entirely preclude the introduction of stereotyp-
ing evidence does not mean that this "catch-all" option is capable
of the kind of specific analysis necessary to examine complex
stereotyping issues.112 Stereotyping is a difficult, developing,
and controversial breed of employment discrimination. 113
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs and their lawyers are un-
108. In stereotype cases, the employer's proffered motive and the alleged
gender bias are one entity, one is not a "pretext" for the other. It is illogical to
accuse an employer who has admitted to an arguably illegitimate motive of us-
ing that motive as a "pretext" or coverup.
109. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) (describing the
limits of McDonnell Douglas).
110. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627
(Minn. 1988) (en banc). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (explaining that under MDonnell Douglas the plain-
tiff's second option is to "directly" persuade the court of discrimination).
111. McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en
bane) (explaining that even if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext, "[she] may
nevertheless prevail if an illegitimate reason 'more likely than not' motivated
the discharge decision") (citing Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627).
112. The dearth of plaintiffs filing stereotype cases in Minnesota seems to
indicate this inadequacy. See GENDER FAnmNss REPORT, supra note 14, at 81
(hypothesizing about the "reluctance of [Minnesota] victims to seek legal re-
dress" in gender discrimination cases).
113. See generally supra part HA-B (discussing stereotyping).
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derstandably hesitant to litigate their claims 1 14 unless the law
explicitly addresses and prohibits stereotyping in the work
place. The direct method of proof under McDonnell Douglas
merely invites the plaintiff to show that discrimination "more
likely than not" motivated her employer; it does not contain a
specific prohibition against stereotyping, or any language about
stereotyping whatsoever." 5  The absence of such language
weakens the effectiveness of Minnesota's framework in the
many instances of employment discrimination in which gender
stereotyping is the predominant or sole issue. In sum, neither
option of McDonnell Douglas adequately serves stereotype
plaintiffs.
D. PPrcE WATERHOUSz. NOT A SATISFYING OPTION
Even though Price Waterhouse is considered a "stereotype
case,"116 adopting a Price Waterhouse framework in addition to,
or instead of, the McDonnell Douglas framework would not
greatly advance Minnesota's approach to stereotyping cases.
The Price Waterhouse Court's definition of gender stereotyping
greatly underestimates the wide range of employer decision
making infected with gender stereotypes.
Price Waterhouse's analysis focuses on causation, on the
amount of stereotyping that will be tolerated before an employ-
ment decision will be deemed illegal.117 It deemphasizes the
114. See generally GENDER FAIRNEss REPORT, supra note 14, at 80-84 (dis-
cussing various problems Minnesota victims of employment discrimination face
in bringing and winning claims). In fact, victim reluctance to bring discrimina-
tion cases is a nationwide problem. See BARBARA A. CuRREN, THE LEGAL NEEDS
OF THE PUBLIC 137 (1977) (reporting a national survey by the American Bar
Association and American Bar Foundation revealing that two thirds of the
United States citizens who experience employment discrimination do nothing
about it). See generally Kristen Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A
Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SiGNs 421 (1987) (discussing wo-
men's reluctance to pursue discrimination cases).
115. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24 (describing the direct method of
proof option under McDonnell Douglas).
116. See Bach, supra note 47, at 1264; see also supra note 52 (describing the
critical reception of Price Waterhouse).
117. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (stating the holding of
the case). In fact, many courts outside Minnesota that have addressed stere-
otyping, both state and federal, have focused on articulating guidelines for de-
termining how much stereotyping must taint an employment decision before
the employer is liable, rather than on a definition of the term "stereotyping"
itself. See generally Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. Ruv. 1235, 1237-38 (1988) ("[Causation] tests [articulated by
courts] require that the party with the burden of proof on causation prove that
the unlawful discrimination was either 'a factor,' 'a motivating factor,' the or a
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root problem of defining illegal stereotyping itself."-" Further-
more, when the opinion does turn to identifying, rather than
quantifying, stereotyping, it fails to recognize all but the most
blatant examples of stereotyping at work in employer deci-
sions. 119 Worse, the Court also comments that identifying the
stereotyping in Hopkins' claim was easy, opining that "[lit takes
no special training to discern sex stereotyping" of the kind per-
petrated against Ann Hopkins. 120 The message of Price
determinative factor,' 'a substantial factor,' 'a significant factor,' 'a discernible
factor,' or the 'but for' cause."); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 292 (1982) (weighing the benefits of various standards). For two compel-
ling discussions of causation issues specific to stereotype cases, see Sam
Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner
Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF. L. Rav. 85, 151-61 (1986) (arguing
that "language discrimination" or stereotyping should be illegal even if it is not
determinative of a certain adverse employment decision); Struth, supra note 7,
at 708 ("Since quantifying the degree to which sexual stereotyping had an effect
on the employment decision is an impracticable task, a violation... is certainly
made out when the employee proves that the stereotyping was relied upon in
reaching the adverse employment decision.").
118. "[T]he [Price Waterhouse] Court does not clearly address what consti-
tutes stereotyping." Cava, supra note 64, at 53.
119. The Court attempts to draw a line between legal decision making and
illegal stereotyping, but that line merely separates the statement "Hopkins is
too macho" from the statement "Hopkins is too aggressive." The Court slips by
not recognizing that the difference between such statements is semantic and
superficial. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35 (categorizing adjectives
used by employers such as "macho" and "masculine" as indications of stereotyp-
ing, but adjectives such as "aggressive," "abrasive," "brusque," "harsh," and "dif-
ficult" as legitimate, negative evaluations of Hopkins). See also Radford, supra
note 3, at 526-27 (describing as a "flaw" in Price Waterhouse the Court's failure
to recognize that evaluations "of an individual's 'interpersonal skills' like the
evaluation made of Hopkins are "exactly the type ofjudgement prone to stereo-
typed conclusions"); Eson, supra note 2, at 838-39, 850-51 (discussing the
Supreme Courts failure to address subtle forms of gender discrimination). Ac-
cording to Eson, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse affirmed the district
court's findings that:
Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its
partnership decision, an area in which Hopkins received harsh criti-
cism.... The court had little difficulty acknowledging... that remarks
characterizing Hopkins as.. . "overcompensating for being a woman"
were tainted by sex stereotyping.... Yet for all the Court's ability to
recognize the more obvious sex stereotyping in the evaluation process,
it failed to reach the more subtle discrimination that tainted the as-
sessment of Hopkins' personality. The Court unquestioningly accepted
the firm's harsh evaluation of Hopkins' personality... without further
examining the employment context in which the appraisal was made.
Id.
120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. The Court goes on to say:
[E]xpert testimony [on issues involved in gender stereotyping] was
merely icing on Hopkins' cake.... [It does not] require expertise in
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Waterhouse is that gender stereotyping is both blatant and eas-
ily recognized. In fact, it is rarely either of these.121
Because Price Waterhouse fails to identify and prohibit all
forms of gender discrimination based on stereotyping, both sub-
tle and overt, its adaptation would not advance Minnesota dis-
parate treatment jurisprudence as far as necessary. 122 Because
it implies that judges can and do easily spot gender stereotyping
in discrimination claims, it presents a danger to Minnesota
courtrooms. 123 Thus, Price Waterhouse is not a solution to MAin-
nesota's need for law that addresses stereotyping.
E. BIGGER THAN THE FRAMEWORKS: OTHER WEAKNESSES OF
DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW IN STEREOTYPE CASES
1. Judicial Insensitivity to Gender Stereotyping
Gender stereotyping in employment discrimination is ex-
tremely burdensome to prove in litigation, in part because evi-
dence of stereotyping is sensitive, subjective in form, and easily
denied by employers.' 24 In light of these complexities, courts
must not assume, like the Price Waterhouse Court did, that ster-
eotype-based bias in employment discrimination claims will be
obvious or easily identifiable. 125 Not only do judges sometimes
psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal skills"
can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps
it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn
the criticism.
Id.
121. Indeed, commentators stress that evidence of stereotyping like that
presented by Hopkins is extremely rare. See, e.g., Kandel, supra note 76, at
101, 113 ("[Price Waterhouse) relates to those few cases that present 'smoking
gun' evidence of employment discrimination.... Twenty-five years after the
enactment of Title VII, it is hard to conceive of employers offering plaintiffs and
courts the opportunity to decide [a second case like Price Waterhouse].").
122. Because Price Waterhouse is ultimately ineffective in stereotype cases,
the proposition that Minnesota plaintiffs have the option of bringing their dis-
parate treatment claims in federal rather than state court is weak justification
for preserving the current state of Minnesota's law. See Cava, supra note 64, at
53 (arguing that Price Waterhouse fails to demonstrate "how those subject to
[gender stereotyping at work] can prove its effect" in court).
123. Judges must be more, not less, careful about recognizing stereotyping
in employer decisions. See infra part H.E.1.
124. See GENDER FAmness REPORT, supra note 14, at 82 (discussing gender
discrimination claims in general and stating that, "about half the judges [in
Minnesota] agree that these claims are more difficult to prove than other civil
cases. Employment discrimination cases are complex and frequently turn on
the credibility of one person.").
125. Unfortunately, many courts do take the identification of stereotyping
for granted. "Court opinions use the word [stereotyping] without defining it."
Cava, supra note 64, at 28. "While neither explicitly stating it, courts appear to
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fail to recognize gender stereotyping in such claims,126 often the
judges themselves use stereotypes against female litigators and
parties in their courtrooms. 127 If some judges are unaware of
their own biases, or unconcerned about those biases, they may
not sensitively identify and condemn similar biases in employ-
ers.128 Explicit, proscriptive legal language addressing this is-
treat stereotyping as something 'so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable io require proof, and so certainly known as to make it in-
disputable among reasonable men.'" Id. at 40 (quoting McCoRMIcK ON EVI-
DENCE 992 (E. Cleary ed., 1984)). Cava continues, "Courts have never studied
and mastered the issue, nor devoted energy to understanding the large psycho-
logical and sociological implications of stereotyping. Rather, the operative mea-
sure for handling stereotyping claims seems to be: We can't define it, but we
know it when we see it." Id. at 55. Cf Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 400
A.2d 1182, 1188-89 (N.J. 1979) (Handier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[Not everyone has a nose for discrimination, especially in its most sub-
tle forms .... Discrimination often goes uncorrected because it is undetected.").
126. "[Tlhe hope that the courts ([ I currently male dominated) [will] even be
able to recognize sex stereotyping has been somewhat dim." Radford, supra
note 3, at 485 n.56. Radford's lament was prompted by the following passage
from a district court opinion explaining why a stereotype plaintiff should not
have a cause of action against the law firm refusing her partnership:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is,
in fact, nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse.
Just as in marriage different brides bring different qualities into the
union-some beauty, some money, and some character-so also in pro-
fessional partnerships, new mates or partners are sought and be-
trothed for different reasons and to serve different needs of the
partnership. Some new partners bring legal skills, others bring cli-
ents. Still others bring personality and negotiating skills. In both,
new mates are expected to bring not only ability and industry, but also
moral character, fidelity, trustworthiness, loyalty, personality and
love. Unfortunately, however, in partnerships, as in matrimony, these
needed, worthy and desirable qualities are not necessarily divided
evenly among the applicants according to race, age, sex or religion, and
in some they just are not present at all.
Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Employment Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 1980)).
127. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts:
Stories and Statistics, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2187 (1993); Deborah Ruble Round,
Note, Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2193 (1988).
128. Indeed, the laws seeming inability to affect the sluggish progress of
women to the top levels of most professional fields, see supra note 69, indicates
that perhaps judges and juries are not correctly identifying and proscribing
stereotyping when it surfaces in discrimination claims. See Round, supra note
127, at 2194 ("Gender bias must be eliminated in the judicial system not only
because it influences the perception of women in the courtroom, but also be-
cause it undermines the manner in which courts apply the law and thus affects
the substantive rights of the litigants."). See also Radford, supra note 3, at 534
("[Sex stereotypes] are so deeply entrenched that the judicial system... ha[s]
not yet appreciated their most insidious forms.").
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sue would aid discrimination plaintiffs by sharpening judicial
perception in stereotype claims.
2. The "Intent Requirement" Problem
The stereotype plaintiff who brings her case as a disparate
treatment claim must prove that her employer acted with dis-
criminatory intent. 129 Courts have updated the intent require-
ment to keep pace with more sophisticated employer motives;
unfortunately, that evolution has not been toward a definition of
"intent" helpful to stereotype plaintiffs. Courts recognized that
discrimination may be one of several motives in an illegal em-
ployment decision, a recognition that aids "mixed motive" plain-
tiffs. 13 0 Courts have not, however, recognized that employers
often consciously or unconsciouslyl3 1 allow discrimination to
taint an employment decision, and that such decisions should
also be illegal. Without the second recognition, stereotype plain-
tiffs often fail to meet the disparate treatment intent
requirement.' 3 2
Currently, courts hesitate to hold employers liable for stere-
otyping that is not overt, finding that employers may not have
"intended" subtle discrimination. This hesitancy confuses "in-
tent" with "consciousness."133 Employers may intend to hold a
129. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977); see RoTHSTIN, supra note 24, at 234.
130. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (es-
tablishing the federal "mixed motive" analysis); see also supra note 62 (citing
states that have adopted the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive" framework).
131. For an excellent discussion of the difference between "intene' and "con-
sciousness7 in disparate treatment cases, see Fields, supra note 106, at 177-81.
132. "Because discrimination through sex role stereotyping may not take
the form of overtly sex-biased statements, but rather of 'neutral' criticism of a
woman's job performance, a plaintiff may be unable to demonstrate the causal
role played by the illegitimate motives... despite the prevalence of this type of
gender discrimination." The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, supra note 73, at 348-
50 (citations omitted).
133. Fields uses the Price Waterhouse facts to make this point:
[T]he [C]ourt was incorrect in concluding that... unconscious sexual
stereotyping by the evaluators was not sufficient to establish discrimi-
natory motive.... In [Price Waterhouse], regardless of whether the
partners were "conscious" that their comments resulted from stere-
otypical assumptions, the partners "intended" to judge the plaintiff in
terms of appropriate "feminine" behavior.
Fields, supra note 106, at 179 (analyzing the district court decision in Price
Waterhouse). See also RHODE, supra note 5, at 162 ("Too much concern [in em-
ployment discrimination law] has focused on the conscious motivations of deci-
sion makers and too little on the cumulative disadvantages that their actions




female employee to stereotypical notions of femininity without
realizing that such behavior is discriminatory. 3 4 As author Ei-
leen Fields states, "basing employment decisions on... stere-
otyping, whether conscious or unconscious, clearly constitutes
disparate treatment, since women employees are being judged
on the basis of their sex, rather than on the basis of individual
merit."'3 5
Defining gender stereotyping in the law would assist stereo-
type plaintiffs to hurdle the "intent" obstacle. An official, spe-
cific definition of stereotyping would undermine the credibility of
employers who claim to be unaware that certain notions applied
to female employees are stereotypical. 13 6 Employers would be
forced to scrutinize their decision making for conscious and la-
tent gender bias, and to reject both.1 37
III. LEGISLATIVELY DEFINING GENDER
STEREOTYPING: SUGGESTIONS FOR AN
EFFECTIVE STATUTE
Ironically, as long as the inadequate McDonnell Douglas
framework regarding stereotyping discourages stereotype plain-
tiffs from bringing claims,'13 the Minnesota Supreme Court will
be unable to articulate an effective definition of illegal stereotyp-
ing. Courts may only create or articulate law based on the facts
of cases before them. Thus, the shortage of plaintiffs filing stere-
Women know that much if not most sexism is unconscious, heedless,
patronizing, well-meant, or profit-motivated. It is no less denigrating,
damaging, or sex-specific for not being "on purpose."... Yet, not know-
ing that one has sexist attitudes, or not knowing that they are influenc-
ing one's judgments, is legally taken as a reason that sex
discrimination did not occur.
MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 230.
134. Fields, supra note 106, at 179.
135. Id.
136. Author Alfred W. Blumrosen, grown weary of employer ignorance of
discrimination twenty-five years after Title VII, writes: "The perception that
employment discrimination is a rarity, to be acknowledged only upon a showing
that would satisfy a skeptic from Mars with no knowledge of our history, is
unrealistic." Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1026-27.
137. As federal courts have declared in interpreting Title VII, employment
discrimination law should be "[a] spur or catalyst which causes employers and
unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to
endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).




otype cases 139 makes an imminent judicial definition of illegal
stereotyping unlikely.
Instead' the legislature must act.140 Minnesota law makers
should create a legislative definition of illegal gender based ster-
eotyping. Such a definition would encourage wary plaintiffs to
bring stereotype cases, warn employers that stereotype-based
discrimination is intolerable, and give judges guidance on stere-
otype issues in court. Most importantly, the statute would pro-
vide an official statement that gender based stereotyping
constitutes unlawful discrimination.
In defining stereotyping, the Minnesota legislature must be
specific. A statute that merely prohibits "gender stereotyping by
employers" without defining stereotyping in explicit terms will
provide courts with no greater guidance than they currently
have in recognizing stereotyping, and will afford plaintiffs little
security in the law's competence in this area. The language cho-
sen must capture the varied dynamics and circumstances of gen-
der stereotyping, so that courts will be able to recognize
stereotyping when it surfaces in the plaintiff's evidence. Fi-
nally, the statute must separately address "disparate evalua-
tion" stereotyping and "disparate job criteria" stereotyping' 4 ' to
ensure that the two are not confused, nor one ignored, but also
so that both are specifically defined and proscribed.
A "disparate job criteria" stereotyping plaintiff should be
able to demonstrate stereotyping under the statute by meeting
two requirements. The statute should first require convincing
evidence that the plaintiff's employer had unreasonably narrow
standards of behavior or character for a particular employment
opportunity that were unrelated to her ability to perform the job
and that arose out of preconceptions based on the reality that
the job is usually or traditionally performed by male employees.
The statute should further require the plaintiff to show that
such unreasonable standards adversely influenced an employ-
ment decision concerning her.
139. See supra note 58 (discussing statistics on Minnesota employment dis-
crimination claims).
140. Legislative action to correct or supplement case law has been an effec-
tive tool in employment discrimination law at the federal level. See, e.g., supra
note 46 (noting the effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act on federal disparate treat-
ment law). See generally Gould, supra note 52 (discussing congressional reac-
tion to the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse and other recent
employment discrimination cases); Sandra Hemeryck et al., Reconstruction,
Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and
the Civil'Rights Act of 1990, 25 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475 (1990) (same).
141. See supra part II.B.
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The statute should similarly set forth two requirements for
the "disparate evaluation" plaintiff, It should require her to
demonstrate that her employer made an evaluation of her be-
havior or character that a male employee displaying similar be-
havior or character would not have received. It should also
require her to show that the stereotyped evaluation influenced
the employer's decision.142
If a discrimination plaintiff meets the statute's require-
142. This sample amendment to the "Unfair Discriminatory Practices Act"
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act incorporates the suggestions outlined in
part III:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice under section 363.03,
subd. 1(2)(a)-(c) of this chapter, for an employer to undertake any ac-
tion which adversely affects an employee's employment status when at
least one of the following factors motivates the decision to take such
action:
Subdivision 1. Unreasonable standards or criteria. The employer
subjects a female employee to unreasonable standards of job perform-
ance or unnecessary job criteria that are unrelated to the employee's
ability to perform the reasonable duties of her position. Such illegal
standards or criteria include, but are not limited to, an employer's de-
mand or expectation:
(a) That the employee display any personality traits or other qual-
ifications not demanded by the position she holds, regardless of the
personality traits or qualifications displayed by past or other employ-
ees; or
(b) That the employee not display any trait, habit, or manner, the
manifestation of which is not detrimental to her performance of the
position she holds, regardless of the traits, habits or manners dis-
played or not displayed by past or other employees; or
(c) That the employee demonstrate commitment to her job by
working unreasonable hours, or by making herself available for travel
or particular work scheduling or extra-employment activities, when
such hours or availability or activity are not an essential requirement
of the position she holds, regardless of the schedule kept or availability
or participation of past or other employees.
Subdivision 2. Unreasonable disparate evaluation. The employer
disparately evaluates a female employee's qualifications or behavior or
personality if a male employee displaying similar qualifications, behav-
ior, or personality traits would not be similarly evaluated. Such illegal
evaluations shall include, but not be limited to, evaluations that char-
acterize a female employee as:
(a) Overly aggressive, authoritative, ruthless, or brisk when a
male employee displaying similar behavior or personality traits would
not be evaluated as overly aggressive, authoritative, ruthless, or brisk;
or
(b) Unacceptably unconcerned about her appearance, when a male
employee displaying similar concern for his appearance would not be
evaluated as unacceptably unconcerned with his appearance; or
(c) Unacceptably using unprofessional or offensive language,
when a male employee using similar language would not be evaluated
as unacceptably using unprofessional or offensive language; or
(d) Too unemotional, detached, cold, or undemonstrative when a
male employee displaying similar behavior or personality traits would
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ments for either "disparate job criteria" stereotyping or "dispa-
rate evaluation" stereotyping, the court should find that
impermissible consideration of gender in the form of gender
stereotyping influenced the employer's decision regarding the
plaintiff, and find the employer liable for employment discrimi-
nation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
For too many years, this country has boasted the near ex-
tinction of openly manifested gender discrimination while gener-
ating deplorable statistics of women's advancement in
professional fields. A new wave of attack against employer per-
petrated gender bias is overdue. A statute meeting the above
requirements would begin such an attack by equipping courts
with specific legal definitions with which to measure and frame
stereotype evidence. The statute would help close the widening
gap between the twenty-year-old language of McDonnell Doug-
las and the concrete, current struggles of working women
against much subtler forms of bias. It would move beyond the
deficient treatment of stereotyping in Price Waterhouse, sharpen
judicial analysis of stereotype claims, and help correct the mis-
construction of the disparate treatment "intent" requirement of
stereotype cases, thereby repositioning Minnesota ahead of fed-
eral law in this important area of civil rights jurisprudence.
not be evaluated as too unemotional, detached, cold, or
undemonstrative.
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